Swords and Shields: 2月 2011

2011年2月18日金曜日

Inside Terrorism

一学期の成績が17日､発表されました｡予想通りの可もなく不可もない結果でした｡ほとんど一筆書きで終わらせたエッセイもあったので､二学期はもっと早く書き上げて､じっくり検討し直す余裕を作らねばと反省しています｡唯一の収穫は､国際法に興味を持てたことで､テロやテロ組織への反応を法制度の面から分析する目を養えたと思います｡好きこそものの上手なれ､か､レポートもエッセイも楽しんで取り組めた国際法と武力行使の最終評価はFirst Class Gradeでした｡

2月から二学期が始まり､3コマの選択必修では､Political Terrorism, American Foreign Policy, Politics in Eastern & Central Europeを選びました｡American Foreign Policyは修士論文のテーマと直接関係ないのですが､米国は日本にとって必要不可欠な同盟国であるし､対テロ政策が外交にどう反映されているか､欧州から見た米国像､など興味は尽きません｡せっかくFulbrightでアメリカ社会を研究する機会を与えてもらったので､更に米国の分析と理解を深めようと考えました｡

修士論文に欠かせない講義の一つPolitical Terrorismでは､Bruce Hoffmanの"Inside Terrorism"を教科書にしています｡HoffmanはやはりGeorgetownの教授で､留学当時､TerrorismやInsurgencyの講義を取ろうにも､大人気ですぐに締め切られていました｡その著書が米国だけでなく､こちらでも教科書として使われています｡久しぶりに読み返していて､議論の深さに感銘します｡レファレンスも幅広く､｢これだけの論文や本をどうやって読みこなして構成するのか｣と驚くほど大量で充実しています｡

Hoffman, B
http://explore.georgetown.edu/people/brh6/?PageTemplateID=81
Inside Terrorism
http://explore.georgetown.edu/publications/index.cfm?Action=View&DocumentID=21018

HoffmanやByman, Pillarといい､やはりGeorgetownは優秀な教授陣を揃えています｡さすが､年間200-300万円の学費を要求しているだけはあります｡付言すれば､Inside Terrorism拡大版の前書きに､"Yamazaki Mayuka"さんという日本人学生(2006年時点)への謝辞が書かれています｡オウム真理教による一連のサリンガス･テロの資料を翻訳されたようですが､Hoffmanのような学者の作業をお手伝いされるなんて､素晴らしいし､羨ましい限りです｡

ところで､テロリズムを日本で学ぶにはどうしたらいいか｡こんな記事を見つけました｡

http://wldintel.blog60.fc2.com/blog-entry-330.html

こういった方々がおられたのか､と自分の無知が恥ずかしい限りですが､私はまず､Hoffmanの本をじっくり読むことをお勧めしたいと思います｡Political Terrorismの講義の評価は7000 wordsの期末エッセイのみ｡何としてでもFirst Class Gradeを取りたいものです｡

2011年2月9日水曜日

Japan's vulnerability in AML/CFT

As far as money laundering in Japan concerned, property business is critically abused by organized crime syndicate, so called “Yakuza” or “Boryokudan”, nevertheless the government of Japan has not implemented strong and efficient measure yet, and the industry is seemingly reluctant to tackle with it. The problem is possibly related not only to Japan’s homeland security but also to international security. ‘The downturn in the Japanese economy [in 1990’s] has also led to the Yakuza spreading out from their traditional family/national base and looking for investments and business opportunities’ with numerous front companies (Lilley, 2006:23). In 2000’s, the Yakuza people allegedly makes profit through property dealing as well as stock investment in accordance with the temporal recovery of Japanese economy. Part of such illicit money shall be paid for drug trafficking with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, the official name of North Korea) or arms smuggling from Southeast Asia, for example the ex-militant in Philippine.

On one hand, the land and territory of Japan is very small, on the other hand, its population is geographically quite imbalance. Namely, people, money and goods are highly concentrated in a few huge cities such as Tokyo, Osaka, or Nagoya. Land and property are lucrative for business especially in big cities with high density, therefore Yakuza groups exploit real estate for making money. Adelstein reveals that

The Tokyo Metropolitan Police compiled a list in 2006 of roughly one thousand yakuza front companies in greater Tokyo; about a fifth of them are real estate firms… Some police officers in Tokyo use the word “Realtor” as a synonym for yakuza, so strong are the connections (2009:89).

Although the business people of property industry recognize the fact that the industry and customers are sacrificed by Boryokudan and complain about that, they would not take strong action against Yakuza. It implies the deep-rooted relation between the industry and Boryokudan.

Japanese National Police Agency (NPA) held the round-table conference of Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) in 2010 in which NPA heard opinion about Customer Due Diligence (CDD) from related industries such as financial sector and property dealer. In the series of discussion, the represent of real estate industry appeared to oppose to strict implementation of CDD in the name of customer satisfaction. Rather, they asserted, “Basically we hold attitude not to be involved in illicit dealing”. In fact, the number of Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) by property agent is very limited and negligible in Japan. According to NPA, among the total of 272,325 STRs, real estate industry submitted only 33 reports in 2009. In 2008, the number of STRs by the industry was 21 among the total of 235,260 STRs. Even if the industry lawfully monitors and adequately submits the reports, the number of reports is too small and in appreciable, considering the Yakuza’s business and its front companies. Consequently, it casts the doubt that CDD is effectively implemented in the property industry. However, neither strong action nor progress resulted in the round-table conference.

The property in Japan is assumed to be a key element or a linkage between Yakuza and Kim Jong-il regime of DPRK. According to NPA, the number of Yakuza and affiliated members is about 80,900 in total at the end of 2009. Of 80,900 Yakuza personnel, members are 38,600 and affiliates are 42,300. The GOJ unofficially estimates that nearly half of Yakuza members are North and South Korean-Japanese and their descendant. Meanwhile, the Kim regime saves money in cash of US dollar, Japanese yen, Euro, Swiss franc and so on, in addition possesses leisure homes, apartments and tenants of buildings in Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Macau, Switzerland and Moscow at least (Ino, 2009:123-124). The press reports that the dictator of DPRK ‘has $4 billion “emergency fund” hidden in secret accounts in European banks’.

According to some sources, it is estimated that over US$ 500 million at least has been flowed and transferred from Japan to North Korea in recent years. The money contains donation, legal and illegal business, and supposedly profit earned by dealing with Yakuza. DPRK’s illicit money is consumed for its WMD and nuclear programme, arms and missile dealing with rogue states such as Iran, Syria and Burma, and eventually, it is posing grave threat to international peace and security. Thus, strict implementation and enforcement of AML/CFT measures in Japan’s property industry is contributed not only to break the link of Yakuza and DPRK, but also to disrupt rogue states’ network. NPA and GOJ should urgently take strong and proactive measure for financial intelligence particularly in real estate industry.

References

Adelstein, Joshua. 2009. Tokyo vice: an American reporter on the police beat in Japan. New York: Pantheon Books.
Ino, Seiichi. 2009. Kim Jong-il no yuigon [Kim Jong-il’s will]. Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Publications.
Lilley, Peter. 2006. Dirty Dealing. London: Kogan Page.

2011年2月5日土曜日

WikiLeaks: Terrorism

WikiLeaks: Balkan, North Korea, and Ireland

2011年2月4日金曜日

Countering North Korea

日本における北朝鮮政策の考え方と対策の私見です｡大学院前期のエッセイ2本で書いたものの結論をまとめて貼り付けました｡課題に対応するため､付け焼刃で学んだ部分もありますが､骨格は同じです｡国際法上､また現実的に北朝鮮に対して先制攻撃をすることは不可能なため､マネーロンダリング対策と経済制裁を､特に金政権中枢と幹部に狙いを定めて国際社会と協力の上､実施すべきだと考えます｡

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was labelled as axis of evil by President Bush in 2002. On one hand, DPRK has been developing missile programmes and nuclear weapons, on the other hand, they maintain the network and link to so-called rogue state and non-state actors such as Iran, including Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Syria, Hezbollah, and possibly Burma. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1718 and 1874 in response to North Korea’s first nuclear tests in 2006 and second one in 2009. Nevertheless, DPRK allegedly attacked South Korean Navy warship and killed 46 of its sailors on 26 March 2010, fired artillery shells at South Korea’s Yeonpyeong island and killed 4 people on 23 November 2010.

DPRK has been posing threat to international peace and security, disobeying the SC resolutions with showing defiance and perversity, and continuing its brinkmanship. Nonetheless, international community cannot conduct pre-emptive attack on them, insofar as necessity of attack and imminence of threat are proved as evidences. ‘In other words, a state may not military action against another state when an attack is only a hypothetical possibility, and not yet in progress—even in the case of weapons of mass destruction’ (O'Connell, 2002:11). Bush administration failed to prove it, therefore many states considered Operation Iraqi Freedom as unlawful attack, and rejected to accept the operation.

Even though Sofaer (2003:226) advocates that ‘[p]re-emption must be considered responsibly, on a case-by-case basis, but it remains one aspect of every government’s duty to protect its people’, approval or concession of pre-emptive attack as well as preventive one leads to necessarily wreak grave threat in international community. That is because rogue states such as DPRK would justify their use of force in the name of pre-emptive self-defence, learning from Bush doctrine and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The principle is that state(s) should exhaust peaceful alternatives before resorting to use of force.

O’Connell (2002:17-18) argues that ‘[i]f the Bush administration has convincing evidence of any serious threat to it from Iraq, it would stand a good chance of getting Security Council authorization to use force’. That might be true, however at least UN or the Security Council require a mechanism where member states have to prove the convincing evidence of threat posed on them as well as intelligence to other member states or Security Council. Insofar as such a mechanism is not established, pre-emptive attack and preventive use of force could not be legal military action.

Seven months after adopting UNSCR 1874, the South Korean warship was sunken allegedly by DPRK and 46 sailors were killed. Then, eight months later, North Korea attacked by bombs on the Yeonpyeong island of South Korea. International peace and security is jeopardized by a rogue country. The authoritarian North Korea is currently centred in rogue connection with Iran, Syria, possibly Burma and Hezbollah. Therefore, analysis of DPRK’s brinkmanship is productive for international community to deal with rogue state and non-state actor.

The Banco Delta Asia (BDA) case implies significant lessons. Firstly, coercive measure of criminalization such as the section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act is powerful, useful and influential to be imposed on targeted state. Secondly, the coercive sanction should be imposed on independently. Being separated from diplomacy, the measure would function much effectively. Thirdly, coercive measure of criminalization should not be legislated by only powerful country, but must be legislated and implemented by member states of international community in order to enhance the power and efficacy of the sanction. The lessons are true to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the United Nations regime. The member states and participants of PSI currently operate on voluntary basis under the international law and domestic laws. If the PSI strongly recommends its member states and participants to legislate coercive measure of criminalization, it is assumed that the achievement of PSI operation would be successfully increasing.

As to dealing with North Korea particularly, People's Republic of China (PRC) ’s commitment is indispensable for international peace and security. Needless to say sincere implementation of UNSCRs, China must participate in the PSI and legislate coercive measure of criminalization. As demonstrated in the BDA case, coercive measure is damaging in the authoritarian state. Considering the fact that the dear leader, Kim Jong-il bribes and rewards the cadres and security forces, targeted coercive sanction on those high ranked members is the most effective. Again, DPRK is the core of rogue network. Accordingly to be concluded, coercive measure of criminalization is crucial strategy for international community to deal with not only North Korea but also other rogue states.

Reference

Byman, D. and Lind, J. 2010. Pyongyong’s survival strategy tools of authoritarian control in North Korea. International Security, 35(1). pp. 44-74.
O’Connell, M, E. 2002. The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense. The American Society of International Law Task Force on Terrorism, Task Force Papers, pp. 1-21. Available from: http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf
Sofaer, Abraham. D. 2003. On the Necessity of Pre-emption. European Journal of International Law, 14(2), pp. 209-226.

これらの他にも直接引用はしていないものの､諸氏のアイデアを使った箇所があります｡このページは論文ではないので､個々の記載は省かせてもらいます｡ご了承ください｡
Notice: Except for direct citations, this article also includes some ideas asserted by other scholars. However, this page is not for academic purpose but just for a weblog, therefore the author curtails of referring all of the books, articles and documents.

French counter-terrorism

昨年のクリスマス休暇は､友人家族の招待を受けてパリで過ごしたのですが､花の都で目にしたのは自動小銃を抱えた多くの警察官と治安部隊の姿でした｡夏の終わりに続いてテロ警告が出ていたのかと思ったのですが､そうではなく､1990年代以降フランスにおけるテロ対策の姿だと理解しました｡以下は､｢国際安全保障｣の期末エッセイで引用した論文からの抽出です｡エッセイの出来は予想を裏切り､"first class student"の評価をもらいました｡

'The French authorities regect the idea that the Muslim community should be a "partner" in counter-terrorism and continue to use preventive arrests and extradition as primary counter-terrrorism measures. The French government also relied upon past experience: the policy of early disruption of group activities by means of forcible removals is regarded as faving been successful in countering the terrorist wave perpetrated by the Algerian GSPC in 1990s'.
'The French provided the information needed to foil the plot for the Millennium attack on Los Angels Airport, when Ahmed Ressam was arrested on the Canadian border on 14 December 1999 with explosives in the boot of his car'. 'He [Ressam] was related to the so-called "Roubaix gang", which was also responsible for the foiled attack on the Strasbourg Christmas market'.
'[T]he French approach as crime-focused compared to the American "war against terror". The French state behaves in the "Latin model" ...and does not need to consult or seek public approval when acting in the sovereign realms of the state, which includes policing'.
'[T]he French authorities realised that they were unaware of the campaign of attacks prepared by Algerian terrorist groups in Paris. The turn-around came when the police put an end to a series of attacks in 1995 on the Paris Metro, a case that ended in 21 convictions of co-conspirators in 1999. In fact, suspected terrorists are not treated as ordinary criminals'.
'In 2006, prior to the election of Nicolas Sarkozy to the presidency, the French government announced the preparation of reforms to counter-terrorism enforcement, which will reportedly strengthen the police's surveillance powers and also emphasise the prevention and monitoring of the social consequences of counter-terrorism'.

特に最後の項目は､9/11後のアメリカ､すなわち愛国者法と哲学が同じであり､また､強権的なサルコジ政権成立前から導入されていた点に､フランス流テロ対策の考え方が表れていると思います｡引用元は以下の記事｡

Klausen, Jytte. 2009. British Counter-Terrorism After 7/7: Adapting Community Policing to the Fight Against Domestic Terrorism. Journal of Ethinic and Migration Studies. 35(3), pp. 403-420.

タイトルから察せられるとおり､この論文の主題はロンドン同時テロ後における英国政府の対策です｡そのアンチテーゼとして､フランスのテロ対策が取り上げられ､｢基本的人権とプライバシーの点で問題あり｣というのがKlausenの考えです｡

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