2011年6月27日月曜日
MI-5, MI-6 and Churchill-Glance at London
6月､ダブリンから飛行機で一時間余りのロンドンへ行ってきました｡テムズ川上空を西へ向かいながら高度を下げ､ヒースロー空港に着陸｡アイルランド共和国からの乗客専用と思われるゲートとバッゲージクレームを通過したのですが､こんなところにも愛英間の歴史が垣間見えます｡空港からは地下鉄･チューブでロンドン市内のキングス･クロス駅で下車しました｡
ホテルに荷物を置き､早速向かったのはテムズ川の南側にあるMI-6本部です｡チューブのVauxhall駅で下りて階段を駆け上がると､エメラルドグリーンのガラスとベージュ色の壁が重層的に組み合わさった要塞のような建物が眼前にそびえ建っていました｡正面玄関はもちろん､外観のいたるところにCCTVがレンズを光らせています｡テムズ川の目の前に位置していることから､本部近くには散歩道が整備されており､川岸で犬と戯れる人や､散歩道のベンチで肩を組んで仲良く話す男女の姿もありました｡
Vauxhall橋を渡ってMillbankを北へ歩き､MI-5本部が入る政府ビルを目指します｡MI-6をGoogleで検索すると地図にも表示され､写真も出てくるのですが､MI-5の方は出てきません｡そのため､所在地はChristopher Andrew博士のMI-5公式史書"The Defense of the Realm"で調べておきました｡本部が入ると思われる建物はテムズ川沿いに建ち､対岸の右手にはMI-6本部が見える位置関係で､Millbank SW1にあります｡
通りの左側がMI-5本部ビルで､その先には国会議事堂が見えます｡重厚な石造りの建物が歴史の長さを感じさせますが､MI-5もMI-6と同様､設立されてから100年も経過していません｡通りかかった時間は既に18時を過ぎていました｡入口の人気のなさに秘密性､神秘性を一層引き立てられます｡
ロンドン市内の博物館では､第二次世界大戦中にチャーチルと政府が空襲を避けながら指揮を執った"Churchill War Rooms"を見学しました｡現在は財務省と外務省の建物の地下空間に､政府幹部の執務室や会議室､作業室､電話室､更には､台所や寝室など多くの部屋が広がっており､戦時中そのままに保存されています｡チャーチルがこの地下室で愛飲したシャンパンやワインのほか､在職当時の首相官邸の正面玄関ドアまで展示されていました｡
2011年6月25日土曜日
"The French Experience of Counter-Terrorism"
Here are some citations from Shapio and Suzan (2003). They argue counterterrorism policy, system and measures in France which have functioned very well especially since 1990's. The crucial factor of France's counterterrorism is the magistrates which are charged with the special judicial system.
While the system is sometimes criticized from the human rights' and civil liberty's perspectives, France, indeed, has been successfully preventing terrorist attack in homeland since the late 1990's and contributing to allied states' fight against terrorism in terms of information sharing. For example, '[i]n December 1999, Ahmed Ressam, and Algerian trained in Afghanistanm was arrested after attempting to enter the United States from Canada; he was convicted for the so-called Millennium Plot that planned bombings in Los Angeles' (Rollings, 2011:21). The governemt of France conveyed the intelligence about the plot to the Canadian authority, which gravely contributed to thwarting the plot.
I think French counterterrorism policy and system are very good example, because they imply that their measures are empirical efficacy in combating against the linkage of terrorism and crime, and that counterterrorism are wide variety and different from states to states, rather than one-size-fit-all policy.
'French policymakers decided to vastly increase the French capacity to suppress attacks on French soil by strengthing the French police and judicial apparatus in the field of counter-terrorism. While suppression of terrorism can never be a perfect science, the French efforts addressed two interrelated problems that had made suppression particularly difficult in France: a lack of coordination and centralisation of anti-terrorist policies internally; and politicisation of the struggle against terrorism' (p.75).
'New and specialised organizations were created within the interior ministry (Unite de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste - UCLAT) and the justice ministry (Service pour Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste - SCLAT), and were specifically charged with maintaining relationsips and information flows. The purpose of these organisations is to make connections between all of the various intelligence and police services with the French governement bearing on the question of terrorism....According to one of the authors of the legislation, this system was in part explicitly modelled on the US National Security Council and the interagency process it oversees' (pp.76-77).
'The 1986 legislation...centralised proceedings relating to terrorism in the existing Trial Court of Paris and left to normal judges the ultimate decision as to the outcome of the cases.' 'Under this system, a local prosecutor decides if a crime committed within his geographic area of responsibility is related to terrorism, based on a definition of terrorism as "acts committed by individuals or groups that have as a goal to gravely trouble public order by intimidation or terror". If an incident meets that definition, he refers the case to specialised prosecutors or magistrates within the Paris court' (p.77).
"The networks of thte diverse armed Algerian groups supported themselves through armed robberies and trafficking in credit cards and false documents such as passports. New legislative initiatives in 1995 and 1996, while not making any major changes to the French counter-terrorism system, helped the magistrates to target the logistics networks by codifying he notion that conspiracy to commit to terrorism was itself terrorism" (p.82).
'The magistrates consider the system a success: even though it is impossible to prevent all attacks, they nevertheless possess the means to generate a broad picture of the Islamist movement, one that permits them to dismantle networks very rapidly, to prevent many attakcs and to anticipate the evolution of a constantly mutating threat.' 'Two areas in particular have been the object of acerbic criticisms: the preventative round-ups and the associated indiscriminate detention fo suspects; and the broad powers given to the magistrates to conduct these sweeps and detentions with very little oversight' (p.84).
'[A]rresting a large numbe of people, in the view of the magistrates, makes it possible to carry out corroborated interrogations to maintain knowledge of perpetually evolving networks' (p.85).
'The Roubaix (gang) affair began with several leavily armed robberies in the Roubaix region in the period January-February 1996. The robberies originally appeared to have no relation to international terrorism. On the eve of the G-7 summit at Lille on 29 March 1996, however, the gang put a bomb in a car near police station; the bomb was discovered and dismantled. In the subsequent investigation, one of the members of the gang was identified....A subsequent investigation determined their link to the Islamist movement, but, despite this connection, the Roubaix gang were not typical Algerian guerrilla fighters. Rather, they were native-born French citizens and second-generation French North Africans who had converted to radical Islam in France and made their connections with the terrorist movement in Bosnia and Afghanistan' (pp.86-87).
'France and the United States, in particular, have numerous differences in their capacities, their cultures and the types of terrorist threats that they face. These differences mean that institutions cannot and should not simply be copied from one to the other, regardless of their efficacy in their original context.' 'From an historical standpoint, Fracne's experience with the threat of internal subversion has long allowed and even demanded the existence of powerful domestic intelligence agenies. As a result, the French intelligence services have built up an extensive system of domestic monitoring, particularly in the Arab community.' 'Finally, because France has lived so long under the spectre of terrorism at home, neither state officials nor the public views the problem as transitory or fixable, but rather sees political terrorism as an inevitable and permanent feature of modern life. French system therefore seeks to manage and minimise the problem rather than solve it' (p.88).
'Thus, for example, on lesson the magistrates were able to glean from this experience was the importance of attacking logistical and financing networks. Terrorist attakcs do not happen in vacuum. They are often prepared over a fairly long period, and require people in place to provide documents, shelter and directions, as well financing and the colleciton of intelligence on the target' (p.90).
'French authorities have been careful not to claim that al-Qaeda has no cells in France and, to the contrary, repeatedly assert that they believe al-Qaeda and other Islamist groups are active in France and indeed are targeting France' (p.94, note).
In fact recently, 'French officials declared that France is "at war Al Qaeda" following AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb)'s murder of a French hostage and AQIM issued several calls for attaks on France. A Franch national critical terrorism threat alert in September 2010 was attributed, in part, to a rise in AQIM threats, and in October, a message attributed to Osanma Bin Laden justified AQIM and other Al Qaeda attacks on France' (Rollings, 2011:19-20).
References
While the system is sometimes criticized from the human rights' and civil liberty's perspectives, France, indeed, has been successfully preventing terrorist attack in homeland since the late 1990's and contributing to allied states' fight against terrorism in terms of information sharing. For example, '[i]n December 1999, Ahmed Ressam, and Algerian trained in Afghanistanm was arrested after attempting to enter the United States from Canada; he was convicted for the so-called Millennium Plot that planned bombings in Los Angeles' (Rollings, 2011:21). The governemt of France conveyed the intelligence about the plot to the Canadian authority, which gravely contributed to thwarting the plot.
I think French counterterrorism policy and system are very good example, because they imply that their measures are empirical efficacy in combating against the linkage of terrorism and crime, and that counterterrorism are wide variety and different from states to states, rather than one-size-fit-all policy.
'French policymakers decided to vastly increase the French capacity to suppress attacks on French soil by strengthing the French police and judicial apparatus in the field of counter-terrorism. While suppression of terrorism can never be a perfect science, the French efforts addressed two interrelated problems that had made suppression particularly difficult in France: a lack of coordination and centralisation of anti-terrorist policies internally; and politicisation of the struggle against terrorism' (p.75).
'New and specialised organizations were created within the interior ministry (Unite de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste - UCLAT) and the justice ministry (Service pour Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste - SCLAT), and were specifically charged with maintaining relationsips and information flows. The purpose of these organisations is to make connections between all of the various intelligence and police services with the French governement bearing on the question of terrorism....According to one of the authors of the legislation, this system was in part explicitly modelled on the US National Security Council and the interagency process it oversees' (pp.76-77).
'The 1986 legislation...centralised proceedings relating to terrorism in the existing Trial Court of Paris and left to normal judges the ultimate decision as to the outcome of the cases.' 'Under this system, a local prosecutor decides if a crime committed within his geographic area of responsibility is related to terrorism, based on a definition of terrorism as "acts committed by individuals or groups that have as a goal to gravely trouble public order by intimidation or terror". If an incident meets that definition, he refers the case to specialised prosecutors or magistrates within the Paris court' (p.77).
"The networks of thte diverse armed Algerian groups supported themselves through armed robberies and trafficking in credit cards and false documents such as passports. New legislative initiatives in 1995 and 1996, while not making any major changes to the French counter-terrorism system, helped the magistrates to target the logistics networks by codifying he notion that conspiracy to commit to terrorism was itself terrorism" (p.82).
'The magistrates consider the system a success: even though it is impossible to prevent all attacks, they nevertheless possess the means to generate a broad picture of the Islamist movement, one that permits them to dismantle networks very rapidly, to prevent many attakcs and to anticipate the evolution of a constantly mutating threat.' 'Two areas in particular have been the object of acerbic criticisms: the preventative round-ups and the associated indiscriminate detention fo suspects; and the broad powers given to the magistrates to conduct these sweeps and detentions with very little oversight' (p.84).
'[A]rresting a large numbe of people, in the view of the magistrates, makes it possible to carry out corroborated interrogations to maintain knowledge of perpetually evolving networks' (p.85).
'The Roubaix (gang) affair began with several leavily armed robberies in the Roubaix region in the period January-February 1996. The robberies originally appeared to have no relation to international terrorism. On the eve of the G-7 summit at Lille on 29 March 1996, however, the gang put a bomb in a car near police station; the bomb was discovered and dismantled. In the subsequent investigation, one of the members of the gang was identified....A subsequent investigation determined their link to the Islamist movement, but, despite this connection, the Roubaix gang were not typical Algerian guerrilla fighters. Rather, they were native-born French citizens and second-generation French North Africans who had converted to radical Islam in France and made their connections with the terrorist movement in Bosnia and Afghanistan' (pp.86-87).
'France and the United States, in particular, have numerous differences in their capacities, their cultures and the types of terrorist threats that they face. These differences mean that institutions cannot and should not simply be copied from one to the other, regardless of their efficacy in their original context.' 'From an historical standpoint, Fracne's experience with the threat of internal subversion has long allowed and even demanded the existence of powerful domestic intelligence agenies. As a result, the French intelligence services have built up an extensive system of domestic monitoring, particularly in the Arab community.' 'Finally, because France has lived so long under the spectre of terrorism at home, neither state officials nor the public views the problem as transitory or fixable, but rather sees political terrorism as an inevitable and permanent feature of modern life. French system therefore seeks to manage and minimise the problem rather than solve it' (p.88).
'Thus, for example, on lesson the magistrates were able to glean from this experience was the importance of attacking logistical and financing networks. Terrorist attakcs do not happen in vacuum. They are often prepared over a fairly long period, and require people in place to provide documents, shelter and directions, as well financing and the colleciton of intelligence on the target' (p.90).
'French authorities have been careful not to claim that al-Qaeda has no cells in France and, to the contrary, repeatedly assert that they believe al-Qaeda and other Islamist groups are active in France and indeed are targeting France' (p.94, note).
In fact recently, 'French officials declared that France is "at war Al Qaeda" following AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb)'s murder of a French hostage and AQIM issued several calls for attaks on France. A Franch national critical terrorism threat alert in September 2010 was attributed, in part, to a rise in AQIM threats, and in October, a message attributed to Osanma Bin Laden justified AQIM and other Al Qaeda attacks on France' (Rollings, 2011:19-20).
References
- Rollings, J. 2011. Al Qaeda and affiliates: Historical perspective, global presence, and implications for U.S. policy. CRS Report for Congress, 25 January, R41070. Congressional Research Service.
- Shapiro, J and Suzan, B. 2003. The French experience of counter-terrorism. Survival, 45(1), pp.67-98.
2011年6月24日金曜日
Al Qaeda in Pakistan
以前のエントリ"Bin Ladin in Abbottabad"で､CNNが昨年10月の時点でNATO関係者からOsama bin Ladinのパキスタン北西部潜伏情報を報じていたと記しました｡2011年1月のCRS Reportでもその報道を取り上げています｡
"CNN quoted a NATO offcial on Octorber 18, 2010 that assessments from the U.S-led coalition now say the two are likely in a settled area near the border with Afghanistan, and not living in a very remote uninhabited area" (Rollins, 2011:9).
この"the two"とは､bin LadinとAyman al-Zawahiriを指しています｡
"Al Qaeda founder Osama Bin Ladin and his deputy, Egyptian Islamist radical Ayman al-Zawahiri, are widely believed to be hiding in northewestern Pakistan, along with most other senior operatives" (Rollins, 2011:10).
Rollins, J. 2011. Al Qaeda and affiliates: Historical perspective, global presence, and implication for U.S. policy. CRS Report for Congress, 25 January. R41070. Congressional Research Service.
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/137015.pdf
結果的にパキスタン北西部のアボタバードに潜伏していたのはbin Ladinと彼の家族で､al-Zawahiriはいませんでした｡それでも､おおよその場所を特定し､協力者を作ってbin Ladinを仕留めたCIAをはじめとする米国のインテリジェンス能力には脱帽です｡作戦実行の半年以上も前に､こうしてニュースとして流れていたにもかかわらず､です｡
CNNの記事では､bin Ladinとal-Zawahiriは別々に潜伏しており､特にbin Ladinは地元民とパキスタンの情報機関に守られて過ごしていると報じていました｡
Starr, B. 2010. NATO official: Bin Ladin, deputy hiding in northwest Pakistan. CNN, 18 October.
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-18/world/afghanistan.bin.laden_1_tribal-areas-al-qaeda-leadership-chitral?_s=PM:WORLD
"CNN quoted a NATO offcial on Octorber 18, 2010 that assessments from the U.S-led coalition now say the two are likely in a settled area near the border with Afghanistan, and not living in a very remote uninhabited area" (Rollins, 2011:9).
この"the two"とは､bin LadinとAyman al-Zawahiriを指しています｡
"Al Qaeda founder Osama Bin Ladin and his deputy, Egyptian Islamist radical Ayman al-Zawahiri, are widely believed to be hiding in northewestern Pakistan, along with most other senior operatives" (Rollins, 2011:10).
Rollins, J. 2011. Al Qaeda and affiliates: Historical perspective, global presence, and implication for U.S. policy. CRS Report for Congress, 25 January. R41070. Congressional Research Service.
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/137015.pdf
結果的にパキスタン北西部のアボタバードに潜伏していたのはbin Ladinと彼の家族で､al-Zawahiriはいませんでした｡それでも､おおよその場所を特定し､協力者を作ってbin Ladinを仕留めたCIAをはじめとする米国のインテリジェンス能力には脱帽です｡作戦実行の半年以上も前に､こうしてニュースとして流れていたにもかかわらず､です｡
CNNの記事では､bin Ladinとal-Zawahiriは別々に潜伏しており､特にbin Ladinは地元民とパキスタンの情報機関に守られて過ごしていると報じていました｡
Starr, B. 2010. NATO official: Bin Ladin, deputy hiding in northwest Pakistan. CNN, 18 October.
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-18/world/afghanistan.bin.laden_1_tribal-areas-al-qaeda-leadership-chitral?_s=PM:WORLD
2011年6月8日水曜日
Counterterrorism in cyberspace
6月7日付の"The Guardian"は一面で、アメリカの連邦捜査機関が過去に逮捕したハッカーたちを情報員として雇い､インターネット上の犯罪を捜査していると報じている｡同紙によると｢米国のハッカーのうち4分の1は捜査機関の情報員｣といい､運用側の捜査機関はFBIとSecret Serviceと断定している｡同紙の発行本国であるイギリスでも､ハッカーの情報を元にした逮捕事例があったという｡
本記:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/jun/06/us-hackers-fbi-informer
サイド:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/jun/06/feds-versus-hackers-recruit-informers?intcmp=239
解説:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/jun/06/hackers-how-and-why-they-hack?intcmp=239
記事では､この捜査手法がネット犯罪やハッカー対策のためという意味合いが強い｡しかし当然､テロ対策上の情報収集と捜査に運用されていたとしてもおかしくないだろう｡先のエントリーで紹介したAudrey Kurth Cronin "How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups"(2006, International Security 31:1)で彼女は､テロ対策としてサイバースペースの監視が重要だと強調している｡
"The time has come to recognize that the stateless, anarchical realm of cyberspace requires better tools for monitoring, countermeasures, and, potentially, even control."
"This may seem a heretical suggestion for liberal states, especially for a state founded on the right of free speech"と譲歩しながらも､"the international community will inevitably be driven to take countermeasures in responces to future attacks"と警告する｡
また､"Western analysts have been misguded in focusing on the potential use of the internet for so-called cyberterrorism (i.e., its use in carrying out attacks)"と､従来のネット監視の主眼を暗に批判した上で､"the internet is far more dangerous as a tool to shore up and perpetuate the al-Qaida movement's constituency.'と主張している｡
Al Qaedaはテロ組織の中でも際立ってインターネットの利用が巧みであるというのが､テロ専門家の一致した見方だ｡他方､今年起きている中東の民衆革命では､Facebook等のsocial networkが活動のプラットホームとして認知された｡Cronin博士のこの論文が掲載された2006年時点では既に､米欧社会で広くFacebookは活用されていたはずだ｡The Guardianの記事を合わせ読むと､既にハッカー情報員によるSNSの監視も行われているのかもしれない｡
本記:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/jun/06/us-hackers-fbi-informer
サイド:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/jun/06/feds-versus-hackers-recruit-informers?intcmp=239
解説:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/jun/06/hackers-how-and-why-they-hack?intcmp=239
記事では､この捜査手法がネット犯罪やハッカー対策のためという意味合いが強い｡しかし当然､テロ対策上の情報収集と捜査に運用されていたとしてもおかしくないだろう｡先のエントリーで紹介したAudrey Kurth Cronin "How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups"(2006, International Security 31:1)で彼女は､テロ対策としてサイバースペースの監視が重要だと強調している｡
"The time has come to recognize that the stateless, anarchical realm of cyberspace requires better tools for monitoring, countermeasures, and, potentially, even control."
"This may seem a heretical suggestion for liberal states, especially for a state founded on the right of free speech"と譲歩しながらも､"the international community will inevitably be driven to take countermeasures in responces to future attacks"と警告する｡
また､"Western analysts have been misguded in focusing on the potential use of the internet for so-called cyberterrorism (i.e., its use in carrying out attacks)"と､従来のネット監視の主眼を暗に批判した上で､"the internet is far more dangerous as a tool to shore up and perpetuate the al-Qaida movement's constituency.'と主張している｡
Al Qaedaはテロ組織の中でも際立ってインターネットの利用が巧みであるというのが､テロ専門家の一致した見方だ｡他方､今年起きている中東の民衆革命では､Facebook等のsocial networkが活動のプラットホームとして認知された｡Cronin博士のこの論文が掲載された2006年時点では既に､米欧社会で広くFacebookは活用されていたはずだ｡The Guardianの記事を合わせ読むと､既にハッカー情報員によるSNSの監視も行われているのかもしれない｡
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